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The problem of transnational terrorism and complications relating to coun-
tering its threat lie at the forefront of many countries’ foreign policy agendas.
Accordingly, Walter Enders and Todd Sandler’s The Political Economy of
Terrorism has received considerable attention since its publication because of its
systematic, policy-relevant contribution to our understanding of the processes
that drive terrorist violence and government responses to it.
The authors identify the primary goal of their project as being the provi-
sion of a broadly accessible study of terrorism via an approach that combines
political analysis and economic methods.  Their application of diverse and pow-
erful analytical tools (including statistical and game-theoretic modeling proce-
dures) enables Enders and Sandler to neatly craft a study that provides an objec-
tive assessment of a topic that is all too often undermined by biased, speculative,
and ill-informed postulations.  In doing so, their work goes a long way toward
spanning the often cavernous divide between the academy and the policy com-
munity.
The authors attempt to build a tripartite methodological approach to the
study of terrorism and counterterrorism; an effort that would doubtless prove
beneficial in other studies in this literature.  While they have clearly succeeded
in wedding quantitative and game-theoretic approaches, they could perhaps have
delved deeper into qualitative and historical approaches to the subject.  This
would be especially valuable in respect to the assumption of rationality in the
decision to employ political violence.  Recent work by Robert Pape and Martha
Crenshaw, as well as much of Enders and Sandler’s considerable body of work,
rests in large part upon the validity of this assumption.  If the authors’ conclu-
sions are to be truly informative we need first to feel comfortable that economic
theories of political behaviors adequately capture the motivating forces underly-
ing the decision to employ terrorist violence.  Such a pursuit is probably best
founded in more in-depth qualitative study into terrorist groups and individuals.
From a topical perspective, Enders and Sandler address a wide-ranging set
of issues, from the unique experience of terrorism in democratic states (chapter
2) and the covariates of individual tactical choices by terrorists (chapter 3) to the
economic impact of terrorism within society (chapter 9) and the role of home-
land security in countering the threat and practice of terrorism (chapter 10). The
topics chosen are, without exception, policy relevant.  They are also, however,
often not tied together very coherently, leaving the reader with the sense that the
book is somewhat cobbled together from the authors’ undoubtedly impressive
earlier body of research.   
The political economy perspective uncovers a range of quite fascinating
conclusions.  Among these, Enders and Sandler demonstrate a high degree of
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substitutability between terrorist actions.  They show, for instance, that follow-
ing the introduction of metal detectors in airports in 1973, there was an observed
switch from hijacking to hostage-taking.  Second, a series of games are
employed to demonstrate why collective transnational efforts by governments to
counter terrorism are frequently sub-optimal.  Third, at a time when we are being
told to prepare ourselves for attacks that will exceed the devastation wrought on
9/11, Enders and Sandler posit that future attacks will most frequently take the
form of logistically simple operations such as bombings.
Despite the clear advantages of methodological diversity and valuable pol-
icy recommendations, there is an additional, notable shortcoming of The
Political Economy of Terrorism. The book strives to be accessible and, in large
part, achieves that goal.  There are, however, a handful of occasions on which the
authors require a lot of their general audience.  Specifically, there are a number
of leaps into statistical and game-theoretic assessments that could be made gen-
tler in order to encourage greater appreciation among non-specialist audiences.
For instance, chapter 4 deals with the general topic of “counter-terrorism” by
detailing the proactive dilemma faced by governments trying to counter the
threat of terrorism.  Simply stated, this dilemma exists where governments need,
on the one hand, to engage in some counter-terrorism practices in order to pro-
vide a basic level of national security, yet are conscious of the fact, on the other
hand, that the use of military force can have the effect of mobilizing popular sup-
port for the terrorist organizations they are attempting to eradicate.  This rather
straightforward conceptual model is immediately complicated, however, by
Enders and Sandler’s immediate immersion into a discussion of the relative value
of proactive and defensive measures given the constraints upon the terrorist
group’s resources (pp. 86-87).  This discussion is illustrative of the considerable
leaps of faith required of the reader to keep pace with the authors’ often sophis-
ticated political economy approach to this subject.
Overall, it is eminently evident that Enders and Sandler have successfully
created a text that will appeal to researchers of terrorism, as well as undergradu-
ate and graduate students in political science and economics.  Beyond this aca-
demic audience, however, there remain question marks as the broader accessi-
bility of this book. 
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